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n late 1990, veteran U�S� Navy strategist Captain Peter M� Swartz was preparing to 
return to the United States after a three-year joint assignment at the U�S� mission 
to NATO in Brussels, Belgium� Swartz desired to return to the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and to the business of naval strategy in which he 
had been so engaged during the previous decade� Swartz was advised strongly 
by his mentor in Brussels, Admiral Jim Hogg, the U�S� military representative to 
NATO’s Military Committee, to take instead a position as a special assistant to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, U�S� Army� 
Swartz reiterated that he was not interested in yet another joint job but instead 
desired to return to the business of creating and disseminating naval strategy� He 
checked, however, with various Navy colleagues and friends� He was surprised 
at how many old Navy friends told him the job working for General Powell was 
“a plum assignment”; they unanimously urged him to take it� One front-running 
naval officer went so far as to suggest that if Swartz did not want it, he should 
let that officer know immediately, so he could bid for it� Admiral Hogg grew 
impatient and gave Swartz one more day to make up his mind� He accepted the 
position�
Swartz plunged immediately into his new job, which involved a very close and 
positive working relationship with General Powell—just when Saddam Hussein 
was wreaking havoc on Kuwait and threatening Saudi Arabia� As Swartz found 
his way around the Pentagon again, he noticed a very high level of Navy talent 
on the Joint Staff—talent that had never been assigned there by the Navy in all 
his previous experience in the Pentagon during the 1970s and 1980s� In contrast, 
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when he returned to visit his old haunts and reestablish his Washington Navy 
network, he was nonplussed by the decline in the experience base and educa-
tional background in some OPNAV shops�
Swartz had an occasion in September 1990 to visit the Joint Staff J8 office 
to get input on a project he was working on for General Powell� While there, 
he spoke to Commander Joe Sestak, whom he knew by reputation and whose 
Harvard doctoral dissertation on the Seventh Fleet Swartz had previously read 
and exploited� Swartz commented to Sestak that he found the disparity of talent 
between OPNAV and the Joint Staff both new and disconcerting; he feared for 
the future intellectual prowess of those in OPNAV and other key Navy institu-
tions� This was a particular concern for Swartz since he had participated in and 
fostered that prowess during his years in OPNAV in the 1980s as an author of 
and advocate for the Maritime Strategy� Sestak responded, “Captain, you’ve been 
away� Goldwater-Nichols happened while you were gone, don’t you remember? 
Do you remember how hard you and your colleagues fought against it? Do you 
remember that you lost?”1
INITIAL IMPACT
Sestak’s short response encapsulated a significant period of change for the 
Navy from 1989 to early 1994� The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 significantly 
changed the way the nation, and particularly the U�S� Navy, approached the busi-
ness of strategy� Alterations to the military chain of command that the legislation 
brought about had officially separated the leaders of the Navy from the service’s 
operational forces as regional, combatant commander–based strategy replaced 
that of centralized, service-based global leadership� The physical domains 
of those regional commanders also increasingly cut across traditional naval 
geographic command boundaries� In addition to removing the responsibility 
for strategy from the Navy’s leadership, the Goldwater-Nichols Act effectively 
dispersed the naval service’s informal but highly effective cohort of strategic 
experts who had been responsible for decades of naval strategy, removed them 
from naval control, and scattered them in assignments on the Joint Staff and the 
regional and functional commanders’ (CINC) staffs� The personnel changes the 
legislation brought about forced many strategy experts like Swartz into joint jobs 
instead of their traditional billets on the OPNAV staff�
This initially had a very positive effect: seasoned, knowledgeable, and experi-
enced naval strategists were now populating influential joint staffs, where their 
capabilities and concepts ensured that the nation continued to deploy and use 
its naval power sensibly� OPNAV office OP-06, the professional home of naval 
strategic concepts during the Cold War, still had a reasonably positive reputa-
tion and attracted some of the Navy’s brightest officers at the end of the 1980s� 
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However, as young officers sought important jobs in Washington, they increas-
ingly recoiled from assignment to OPNAV, instead embracing joint strategy duty 
as an essential ticket on the way to flag rank� Many continued to look for joint as-
signments for their next tour in Washington, while others sought billets in those 
OPNAV offices with strong connections to their warfare communities� Thus, after 
Goldwater-Nichols the “bench” at OP-06 began to weaken, and entering the 
1990s its strength continued to slide�
This combination of change in command structure, alteration of traditional 
naval concepts of the battle space, and migration of Navy strategy experts from 
OPNAV to the Joint Staff altered the Navy’s concept of strategy� The Navy’s most 
senior officers no longer controlled the forces they built, trained, and equipped� 
The concepts of naval strategy that remained in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols 
were regional rather than global in character� Finally, the legislation’s joint per-
sonnel requirements effectively served to disband the Navy’s carefully construct-
ed cohort of strategic experts, dispersing them throughout the joint force� While 
perhaps useful in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, these changes 
would have significant impacts in the first decade of the twenty-first century as 
the Navy sought new strategic solutions to a dwindling budget and an aging, 
contracting force structure�
GENESIS OF THE LEGISLATION
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the most significant shake-up in the Depart-
ment of Defense since its creation in 1949�2 The failure to achieve desired results 
during the Vietnam War may have been the early catalyst for the defense reform 
movement of the late 1970s, but events that followed provided further impetus 
for change� A series of military disasters since the end of the Vietnam War— 
including the failure to rescue hostages in the SS Mayaguez and Iran hostage 
crises of 1973 and 1979–81, respectively, and problems with interservice plan-
ning and communication during the 1983 Lebanon peacekeeping mission and 
invasion of Grenada—provided significant impetus for reform�3 The impression 
of excessive defense spending resulting from soaring Reagan administration mili-
tary budgets caught the eye of some members of Congress and helped generate 
additional legislative-branch interest in defense reform�4 
The reform movement had strong support within Congress and from some 
key Reagan administration officials and the defense intellectual community� 
Congressional supporters such as cosponsors Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz�) 
and Representative Bill Nichols (D-Ga�), Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga�), and Repre-
sentatives Ike Skelton (D-Mo�) and Les Aspin (D-Wis�) felt that greater central-
ization of power in the CJCS office would improve the quality of advice available 
to the nation’s civilian leadership� Goldwater called the legislation “the only 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   23 3/8/16   10:29 AM
3
Wills: The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 2 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
goddamn thing I have ever done in the Senate that was worth a damn�”5 Reagan 
administration members such as National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane 
supported reform efforts, as did former Deputy Defense Secretary David Pack-
ard, whom President Reagan appointed chairman of a presidential blue-ribbon 
commission on defense reform� Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was not in 
favor of reform at first, but later shifted his position—for practical reasons, rather 
than due to an actual change in his beliefs�6
The Navy and Marine Corps leadership, including Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Admiral James D� Watkins and Marine Corps Commandant General P� 
X� Kelley, were generally op-
posed to the legislation, as 
they believed it restricted 
their traditional freedom of 
action and gave other services 
uninformed control over ship-
building and naval and marine operations� Navy Secretary John Lehman offered 
the most vocal criticisms of the proposed legislation and quickly became the 
effective leader of the opposition� He stated that the proposed legislation would 
create inefficient bureaucracy in the Defense Department and reduce the quality 
of military advice offered to the president� Lehman also opposed concentrating 
so much power in the office of the CJCS, which would restrict advice flowing to 
the president to “the opinion and decision of one man, the chairman himself, and 
his general staff bureaucracy�”7 Lehman’s opposition campaign was so well orga-
nized and effective that Senator Goldwater wrote directly to Defense Secretary 
Weinberger and President Reagan to complain that the efforts of Lehman’s staff 
were illegal�8
Despite opposition, and reinforced by findings from Packard’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, the legislation passed Congress by a sig-
nificant bipartisan majority in both the House of Representatives (383–27) and 
Senate (95–0)�9
Although hailed as a great triumph for the defense reform movement, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act was more of an incomplete armistice than a “victory on 
the Potomac,” as the act’s author James Locher contended in his 2002 book� In 
fact, defense reformers had a considerably more radical plan to change funda-
mentally the structure of senior military leadership and the armed forces’ orga-
nization for combat� The Senate Armed Services Committee Staff study entitled 
Defense Organization: The Need for Change, authored by Locher, contained 
ninety-one specific recommendations� It specifically suggested the disestablish-
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in favor of a Joint Military Advisory Coun-
cil independent of all service functions; a reorganization of the military along 
The legislation’s joint personnel requirements 
effectively served to disband the Navy’s care-
fully constructed cohort of strategic experts, 
dispersing them throughout the joint force.
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mission, rather than service, lines; and removal from the chain of command of 
service component commanders located within the unified commands�10
Locher has officially dismissed these proposals as diversionary “bullet traps” 
designed to divert antireform opponents from more-moderate goals�11 Yet 
similar recommendations appear in the memoirs of Senator Goldwater as well 
as those of Senator John Tower�12 There had also been strong arguments from 
analysts influenced by the policies of Defense Secretary Robert S� McNamara 
for reorganization of the Defense Department around joint missions rather than 
geographic or service constructs ever since the Symington Commission of 1961, 
which recommended the abolition of the separate civilian military departments, 
the replacement of the JCS with a group of senior officers separated from their re-
spective service affiliations, and the reduction in authority of the individual ser-
vice chiefs to mere administrative and logistics duties�13 This evidence suggests 
that pro-reform advocates had a much longer list of objectives that were not met 
in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation� The inability of the reform camp to imple-
ment fully the more comprehensive reforms suggests that Secretary Lehman’s 
opposition movement was highly effective in preventing significant alteration to 
U�S� defense organization� The partial reform that was implemented made for an 
uncertain climate as the military services grappled with the problem of creating 
strategy in the post–Cold War era�
SUBSTANCE AND EFFECTS OF THE ACT
The legislation had three significant effects on the creation of military strategy 
within the services and in the Department of Defense at large� It elevated the CJCS 
to the position of principal military adviser to the president� It gave each regional 
combatant commander greater power over his or her organization and regional 
strategy at the expense of service chiefs� These first two changes further restricted 
service leaders’ abilities to influence the development of strategy and formula-
tion of the defense budget, as well as the roles and force structure of the services� 
Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had the effect of diverting talented officers 
from their traditional roles on service staffs to the heretofore less-desirable 
joint and CINC staffs� The services’ own abilities to create and advocate new 
comprehensive, global, strategic concepts withered in this new environment�
As the 1980s came to a close it became evident the Navy would need to imple-
ment the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in an environment in 
which “senior four-star officers no longer had control of the fleet�”14 While the 
service chiefs had been organizationally removed from the military chain of com-
mand in 1958 as part of the Eisenhower reform package, they retained significant 
influence over operational forces� This influence was apparent in the production 
and evolution of the 1980s-era Maritime Strategy� While anchored in the Navy’s 
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traditional responsibility to provide naval force through the six-hundred-ship 
Navy concept, the Maritime Strategy also served as a “contingent warfighting 
doctrine” describing how the U�S� Navy proposed to combat the Soviet Union 
across the multiple regional commands�15
The Maritime Strategy was the latest in a series of naval strategic documents 
from the late 1940s to the 1980s that sought to articulate the Navy’s place in Cold 
War national strategy� These documents generally had been produced at the 
behest and under the guidance of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy� Some 
regional combatant commanders resisted this influence at the time� They, not the 
CNO, were responsible for the employment of combat units against the enemy� 
Future CJCS, then–Pacific commander Admiral William Crowe responded to a 
1984 presentation of the Maritime Strategy, saying, “I’m not sure why the CNO 
needs a maritime strategy; I need one, but he doesn’t�”16 This was an ironic state-
ment, since Admiral Crowe, while serving on the OPNAV staff (OP-06; Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Strategy, Plans, and Policy) during the mid-1970s, 
had been responsible for creating the OPNAV staff office specifically charged 
with strategy creation (OP-603) and filling it with strategy experts�17 Dividing 
up the fleet into theaters subject to the individual war-fighting concepts of indi-
vidual CINCs, not to mention the CINCs’ reluctance to deploy their own ships 
across CINC boundaries, hamstrung the Navy’s attempts to organize, train, and 
equip its forces to deter or confront the Soviet Union�
The Goldwater-Nichols Act seemed, at the time, to settle this argument in 
favor of the primacy of the CJCS and combatant commanders over the service 
chiefs� The legislation elevated the chairman from a position of first among 
equals to that of principal military assistant to the president and gave the chair-
man the authority to convene, set the agenda for, and preside over the meetings 
of the JCS�18 While individual members of the JCS were not prohibited from 
offering separate advice to the president on their own initiative, the chairman’s 
own advice took priority in presidential review over that offered by other service 
chiefs�19 The chairman was also given significant authority over the strategic 
planning and assessment functions of the JCS, with responsibility for providing 
strategic direction and preparing strategic, logistics, and mobility plans for the 
armed forces�20 The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make the chairman 
a “supreme commander of the military services,” as some reformers proposed, 
but it did demand that combatant commanders communicate with the Defense 
Secretary and president through the CJCS officeholder, thus making the chair-
man a “de facto” supreme commander in the eyes of some�21 The service chiefs 
retained their authority to train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant com-
manders, but responsibility for strategy appeared, at that time, to reside firmly in 
joint hands� These provisions would make comprehensive, global, service-based 
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strategic concepts much more difficult to create and implement in the post-
Goldwater-Nichols era�
EFFECTS ON PLANNING
The effects of the legislation soon manifested themselves in the first post-
Goldwater-Nichols Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in early 1987� Intelligence 
reporting at that time indicated that a Soviet attack would be evident at least two 
weeks before it started, thus giving planners time to reinforce Western forces on 
the Central European front�22 This appraisal led to some planning reassessments 
regarding where to focus primary U�S� efforts early in a global conflict� Believ-
ing that constrained resources might force decision makers to choose between 
preparing for a global and preparing for a regional war, Joint Staff planners in 
1987 had attempted to incorporate greater emphasis on regional planning in the 
National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) for fiscal years 1990–94�23 The 
continued reduction of the Soviet threat, particularly the Soviets’ decreasing abil-
ity to project power rapidly into Central Europe and the Persian Gulf, allowed 
Joint Staff planners to focus more on regional strategies� The director of the Joint 
Staff Planning Office (J5) in 1989, Major General George Lee Butler, made the 
projection of increased warning time a justification for greater focus on regional 
planning�24
The impending end of the Cold War and expected drawdown in defense 
spending occupied the efforts of other Joint Staff offices� The new office of the 
Force Structure, Resource, and Assessments Directorate (J8), a direct product 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, conducted a review of several force-reduction 
strategies entitled the “Quiet Study�” However, the departing chairman, Admiral 
Crowe, did not want to recommend force reductions in the absence of a new 
presidential strategy�25 But J8 conducted a second Quiet Study that further fo-
cused on regional instead of global conflicts�
The study’s conclusions were embraced by the new chairman, whose own 
assumptions on the change to regional strategy were closely aligned with the 
language of the Quiet Study 2 report� The appointment of General Colin Pow-
ell to the chairmanship by President George H� W� Bush in 1989 significantly 
aided in the transformation from global to regional-based strategy� General 
Powell embraced the new authority granted him under Goldwater-Nichols “with 
alacrity” and used it to advance a post–Cold War agenda of change�26 General 
Powell expanded the J5 and J8 projects into a combined effort that eventually 
recommended a 25 percent cut in overall military strength in conjunction with 
the change to a regional strategic focus� A briefing entitled “A View to the 90s” 
was produced that encapsulated the views of the chairman as well as Defense 
Secretary Richard Cheney, who largely agreed with Powell’s assessment� These 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   27 3/8/16   10:29 AM
7
Wills: The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 2 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
changes also were incorporated into the president’s National Security Strategy 
and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which were both products of the 
Goldwater-Nichols legislation�
THE BATTLE IS JOINED
General Powell’s full presentation of these changes at a 26 February 1990 meeting 
of the Joint Chiefs and regional commanders was the services’ first chance to op-
pose or propose changes to the chairman’s concept� The Navy, under the leader-
ship of CNO Admiral Carlisle Trost, disagreed with the naval force structure out-
lined in “A View to the 90s�” Admiral Trost believed the Soviet Union still posed a 
global naval threat, and he had two specific complaints about the proposed force 
structure—which related directly to the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act� 
First, and most important, “the Navy had not been a part of the development of 
the force before it was ‘laid on the table’ with the strategy, and thus was not privy 
to the analysis that validated its size and capabilities�”27 Second, due to this lack of 
naval participation, the proposed naval force was too small to be effective in the 
rotational forward presence mission it was intended to fill�28
Admiral Trost was fighting an uphill battle� Before his planned testimony on 
force posture in April 1990, Senate Armed Services Committee members Sena-
tors Sam Nunn and John Warner (R-Va�) both said that the “Chiefs needed ‘to 
come up here with a different story this year, it’s time to reduce�’”29 It was passage 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enabled Powell to create naval force structure 
recommendations without input from the Navy’s service chief, and made possible 
congressional favoring of Powell’s proposal over the objections of the responsible 
service chief� As one chief noted, “[T]he planning for the defense build-down was 
a case of someone determining in advance what was needed, and then seeing that 
the result was produced�”30
General Powell further strengthened the hand of joint versus service-based 
planning in the research, planning, and implementation of the first national mili-
tary strategy (NMS) associated with the new NMSD and DPG� There was broad 
agreement that a change in focus from global to regional-based strategies was 
in order, although some global plans against residual Soviet action persisted�31 
These concepts formed the basis of the 1991 Contingency Planning Guidance 
(CPG) document, which “established a new framework for operational planning 
based upon both the changes that had taken place in the strategic environment 
and expected force reductions�”32 The CPG in turn was the basis for the Joint 
Strategic Contingency Planning document that was the basis for the new, 1991 
NMS that was adopted on 27 January 1992�33 The latter document directed the 
regional commanders in chief to “prepare operational plans that focused on re-
gional threats�”34 The service chiefs all objected to the new strategy, to a degree, 
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but when confronted with President Bush’s demand to reduce the defense budget 
owing to the end of the Cold War, they quickly assented and moved to protect 
their respective budgets�35 The results of the Gulf War also appeared to “validate 
the conceptual underpinnings of the new military strategy,” discouraging further 
argument over its scope and implementation�36
These changes were especially hard on the Navy� It struggled to adjust to a new 
national military strategy, a new force structure determined by outsiders, and a 
fundamental shift in the service’s own maritime strategy concepts� Admiral Frank 
Kelso II, who replaced Admiral Trost as CNO in 1990, had planned to write a 
comprehensive naval plan on a logical reduction of naval forces for the postwar 
world, but could not gain the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Secretary of Defense fast enough to get ahead of General Powell’s efforts�37 The 
results of Kelso’s efforts later appeared in the Naval Institute Proceedings in April 
1991� Kelso said, “I never got approval to publish the article in time for it to have 
the effect I desired� It was finally published after General Powell came up with a 
450-ship Navy that he called a base force� The article had absolutely zero effect 
or impact, because it was not a ‘put your step forward�’ It was ‘Okay, you’ve been 
drug down ship by ship now�’ In other words, it came after the fact that the reduc-
tions had started�”38
Not only was the senior naval leadership no longer in command of the fleet, 
those leaders’ opinions on naval strategy and force structure were rejected in fa-
vor of those of an army general� While defense cuts were inevitable in the wake of 
the Cold War, as they had been after the Second World War, in this case the CJCS 
rather than the CNO or even the Secretary of the Navy made the recommenda-
tion to Congress and the president about what naval forces would be retained� 
The Navy’s inability to exert influence on its own size, composition, and missions 
would negatively impact the ability of naval leadership to create strategy from 
1991 onward�
THE NEW PERSPECTIVE
The chairman’s new powers also extended to the strategic orientation of the ser-
vices� Before 1986, naval officers involved in strategic and operational planning 
had been accustomed to think of broad ocean areas as single conceptual units, 
and the older naval organization of the Atlantic and Pacific commands had rein-
forced that way of thinking�39 The chairman’s new powers, however, included the 
right periodically to review and adjust the missions, responsibilities, geographic 
boundaries, and force structure of each combatant command�40
The Navy had historically seen the whole of the world’s oceans as a unitary 
theater of action uniquely suited to naval control� The service had not, however, 
fully articulated this concept on paper until the creation of the first version of 
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the Maritime Strategy in October 1982�41 Naval leaders had also been loath to 
give land-based commanders any control over ocean areas, owing to their belief 
in a unitary global ocean battle space�42 But while a global Cold War supported 
the Navy’s view, its end allowed for the development of a number of regional 
strategies�
General Powell’s “A View to the 90s” briefing was based on his vision that the 
disintegration of the Soviet empire called for new regional strategies that should 
assume the United States would remain a superpower because of its military 
capabilities, forces, and alliance relationships�43 His solution to this challenge 
involved reshaping not only the force structure but the geographically defined 
battle space in which that force operated� Naval historian John Hattendorf de-
scribed the effect of this change on the Navy as one of “structural change in 
command authority” that “had the intended effect of increasing joint strategic 
and operational planning in specific geographical locations,” but “also had the 
unintended effect of making it more difficult to implement coordinated concepts 
for oceans—the natural geographical unit of maritime space�”44
This process had begun even before Powell was appointed chairman� The 1987 
review of combatant command (COCOM) boundaries required by the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act generated several disputes between the services� The Army attempted 
to revive a previous plan for a subordinate unified Northeast Asia Command cen-
tered on the Korean Peninsula, but this requirement was rejected in the course 
of the Joint Chiefs’ review�45 Of more concern was an appraisal of whether U�S� 
Central Command (USCENTCOM) should assume responsibility for the eastern 
Mediterranean water space directly adjacent to the “confrontational” states of 
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon�46 CNO Admiral Trost counterproposed that both the 
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf be reassigned to U�S� Pacific Command, arguing 
that “USCINCCENT could not carry out his mission without command of the 
seas stretching all the way back to the California coast, which was USCINCPAC’s 
responsibility�” In the end, the JCS review made only a moderate change—it 
assigned limited areas of the Gulfs of Oman and Aden to USCENTCOM 
—and even so Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had to intervene person-
ally to settle the situation�47 The Navy’s objections to the proposed changes to 
COCOM oceanic boundaries demonstrated the service’s concept of a unified 
ocean area of responsibility within which the inherent maneuverability, reach, 
power, and flexibility of naval forces could be optimally deployed and redeployed 
to meet the nation’s challenges�
The Navy had mixed success in retaining its traditional maritime responsibili-
ties during General Powell’s 1991 COCOM review� The new Strategic Command 
and U�S� Atlantic Command (USACOM) had force structures favorable to naval 
leadership, but USACOM acquired maritime geographic responsibilities over the 
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objections of the Navy and Marine Corps leadership� General Powell in particular 
desired that the Navy gunnery range in Vieques, Puerto Rico, be available for 
joint exercises�48
CHANGES THROUGH THE ’90s
These adjustments to COCOM boundaries and areas of responsibility were 
minor in comparison with changes in the late 1990s� But it was the chairman’s 
greater Goldwater-Nichols-mandated authority that made them possible, and 
they supported the continued shift from a global to a regional-based strategy in 
the aftermath of the Cold War�
The 1992 presidential DPG read, “We can shift our defense planning from a fo-
cus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to focus on the less-demanding 
regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future�”49 This 
document further identified four elements of the regional defense concept: plan-
ning for uncertainty, shaping the future security environment, maintenance of 
“strategic depth,” and continued U�S� leadership to maintain security and prevent 
the rise of a successor to the Soviet Union�50
Although the CINC positions were originally designed as regional command-
ers for a global conflict with the Soviet Union, they took on new prominence after 
1991 as the active facilitators of a new world order friendly to U�S� interests� This 
new role was stated in a 16 April 1992 memo by Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Paul Wolfowitz on the contents of the 1992 DPG: “The perceived ability 
of the U�S� to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor, even in 
the cases where we do not actually do so�” Wolfowitz continued:
Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment� We will con-
tinue to rely on forward presence of U�S� forces to show U�S� commitment and lend 
credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote 
U�S� influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis-response 
capability� Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective 
defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies 
to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending 
and of unnecessary arms competition�51
While the new post–Cold War national strategy and national military strategy 
were the original products of the civilian presidential administration and de-
fense secretariat, the principal military inputs came from the office of the chair-
man and the Joint Staff� The services provided only limited input, confined to 
a defense of their spending programs� In comparison with the environment in 
which the Navy had produced the Maritime Strategy, it had now lost control of 
the argument about the size and composition of its force and how and where it 
would fight�
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THE NAVY’S LEGACY OF STRATEGISTS
This change in the Navy’s fortunes was not due to a deficiency in qualified stra-
tegic thinkers� The service had cultivated a cadre of experts since the days of 
War Plan ORANGE, when Navy strategists such as Charles “Savvy” Cooke and 
Richmond K� Turner accurately anticipated the maritime strategy and course of 
the future Pacific war of 1941–45�52
This tradition continued throughout the Cold War, with the service mentoring 
and sustaining a number of experts in naval strategy� While these officers were 
assigned operational, fleet-related billets in the course of their regular career 
paths, they were also rotated through a small number of strategic planning offices 
on the CNO’s staff� They often worked in concert with civilian academics at the 
Naval War College, the traditional home of naval strategic thought and culture 
since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late nineteenth century�
These officers were the product of what naval historian John Hattendorf called 
“[a] resurgence of strategic thinking in the U�S� Navy” in response to the tenure 
of Secretary of Defense Robert S� McNamara (1961–68), during which long-
range planning had been reduced to a series of five-year planning cycles�53 CNO 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt first sought to create a new cadre of strategists through 
the Naval War College� This effort was not entirely successful� The overall cur-
riculum of the War College improved thanks to the efforts of then-President Vice 
Admiral Stansfield Turner, but the school did not attract enough of the Navy’s 
best to create a new strategic culture rapidly�54 Zumwalt’s other focus, however—
on strategic problems in the Pacific and Indian Oceans—did create the desired 
strategic culture through the CNO office staffs that worked on these issues�
The CNO OP-06 and the newly created OP-00K (CNO Executive Panel) of-
fices in particular were a veritable breeding ground for naval strategic thinkers 
over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s� These officers worked in close 
cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Center for Naval Analy-
ses, and did much of the planning and staff work that led to and included the 
Maritime Strategy of the 1980s� The Navy did have a strategy subspecialty code 
that officers could acquire through appropriate military or civilian education, but 
this cadre of strategic experts was informally organized� This was especially true 
in the case of the strategy experts assigned to the CNO’s staff� Captain William 
Spencer Johnson, who served multiple assignments in the OP-06 office in the 
1970s and 1980s, recalled that the executive assistant to the flag officer in charge 
of OP-06 kept a wooden box in his office with file cards detailing those who had 
served in OP-06� This simple filing system recorded their current service billets 
and when they would again be available for service on the OP-06 staff� The ad-
miral in charge of OP-06 essentially had unofficial detailing authority over these 
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officers, and with the support of Naval Personnel Command could order their 
return when requested�55
The officers who headed the OP-06 office included a number of former fleet 
commanders, such as Admirals James “Ace” Lyons, Henry “Hank” Mustin, and 
Charles Larson, as well as future CJCS Admiral William Crowe� Staff members 
such as Captains Swartz and Johnson completed multiple tours within the OP-
06 organization over the course of their careers�56 Multiple assignments within 
OP-06 produced a strong but unofficial strategic community of talented men and 
women within the larger CNO staff�
The efforts of Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Murray stimulated the CNO, 
Admiral Hayward, to create the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) in the 
summer of 1981� The group 
was convened under Mur-
ray’s leadership and mentor-
ship, assisted by Commander 
Kenneth McGruther, Naval 
Reserve Commander John 
Hanley, and others� The initial purpose of the group, according to Commander 
McGruther, was to “reinforce in the Soviet mind the perception that it could not 
win a war with the United States, both before a war, to enhance deterrence, and at 
all phases of the war should it occur�”57
The first SSG became very influential in determining how elements of the 
new Maritime Strategy would eventually be employed� Murray desired that the 
group work on problems of strategy that would be broad enough to be useful, 
but narrow enough in scope to be reasonably accomplished� The SSG could not 
accomplish these goals in isolation and would need to travel globally and discuss 
its proposals with multiple senior officers and staffs�58 The SSG continued oper-
ating over the course of the 1980s and supported further improvements in the 
emerging maritime strategy�
The other important product coming from both the OPNAV strategy offices 
and the SSG was the officers themselves, those who gained great professional ex-
pertise from their assignments to these groups�59 They constituted an expanding 
cadre of strategic-minded officers trained both to create strategy and to anticipate 
responses to that strategy from opponents� The interaction of the OPNAV strat-
egy offices such as OP-603, the SSG, and naval intelligence experts channeled the 
inspiration for a new naval strategy to confront the Soviet Union into plans and 
war-fighting doctrine useful to operational commanders� This group’s combina-
tion of operational, academic, and cooperative experience was well suited to the 
rapid and effective production and updating of strategy-related materials�
“The planning for the defense build-down was 
a case of someone determining in advance 
what was needed, and then seeing that the 
result was produced.”
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The changes wrought by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation would eventually 
transform this group over time from an officially constituted forum to an ad 
hoc assembly maintained by the members themselves� This alteration occurred 
through modification of both missions and personnel composition of these co-
operative strategic entities�
One of the most contested aspects of the legislation was the establishment of 
a rigorous qualification, assignment, and management program for joint-duty 
officers� Owing to a perceived predilection in the services to assign less-qualified 
officers to the Joint Staff, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to submit an 
annual Joint Officer Management report to the legislative branch� This document 
was to report joint-duty officers’ number, promotion rate, and promotion rate in 
comparison with non-joint-qualified officers, and to which billets each service 
assigned such officers� This focus on joint assignments caused a significant shift 
in where the talented officers of each service were assigned�
The OP-06 office had risen to prominence during the 1980s in the course of its 
work with the Maritime Strategy� CNOs Hayward and Watkins as well as Secre-
tary Lehman valued its inputs and contributions (along with those of the 00K of-
fice) to the creation of the NMS and its communication to a wider audience� The 
emphasis demanded by Goldwater-Nichols on joint versus service-centric ac-
tivities, however, helped bring about a significant reorganization in the OPNAV 
office structure that weakened the influence of OP-06 on both naval and wider 
strategic concerns�
Over the period of 1992–93, CNO Kelso conducted a major reorganization 
of the OPNAV staff structure in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provi-
sions; it was conceptualized and implemented by Vice Admiral Bill Owens, one 
of the members of the first SSG� OP codes became N-coded offices that mirrored 
the Joint Staff� A new and powerful N8 office (Integration of Capabilities and 
Resources) was constructed from the warfare “baron” offices of OP-02, -03, and 
-05 (Deputy CNOs for submarine, surface, and air warfare, respectively); Owens 
was the first to head the new office�60 N8 was considerably more powerful than 
the old OP-06 in a new world in which Goldwater-Nichols had determined that 
services only built, trained, and equipped forces, but did not conduct strategic 
planning for their use� OP-06 itself became N3/N5 and lost influence, as OPNAV 
had considerably less influence on the Joint Staff now that it worked for the CJCS 
alone and not the collective Joint Chiefs�61
The SSG also changed in form and content, but perhaps less directly than the 
offices of the OPNAV staff� The SSG moved from being a Cold War naval strategy 
and operations think tank to being a wider DIME (i�e�, diplomacy, information, 
military, economics) effort�62 It acquired its first members outside the Navy and 
Marine Corps in 1993 and its focus became a global search for places where naval 
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forces would be relevant� Much of this change was precipitated by the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but some was in response to the 
activities of the empowered office of the CJCS� The chairman, rather than Navy 
flag officers, now made force-structure recommendations�
BUDGET AND OTHER CHALLENGES
Admiral Kelso had replaced Admiral Trost as CNO in June 1990 and was imme-
diately confronted by a host of direct and indirect challenges to the maintenance 
of a robust naval force structure� Kelso acknowledged in his Senate confirmation 
hearing that the Maritime Strategy was “on the shelf,” and that the six-hundred-
ship Navy concept should be replaced by a more flexible number�63 The end of the 
Maritime Strategy and change of CNO leadership created a power struggle in the 
OPNAV staff as competing offices sought to present new strategic visions to the 
CNO� This struggle produced a general document known as “The Way Ahead�”64
Budget estimates, however, continued to stymie the CNO’s efforts to support 
his vision functionally� Kelso had hoped to kick off the 1991 budget season with 
a positive and influential Total Force Assessment briefing to accompany the 
Navy’s budget proposals� Instead, he got a sobering and dismal appraisal of what 
force the Navy might field in the post–Cold War era� Captain Richard Diamond, 
the OP-603 branch chief who gave the brief, recalled that Kelso responded to its 
contents with a “barrage of scatological invectives and expletives�” One particular 
slide, entitled “The Coming USN Budget Train Wreck,” predicted that the Navy 
“was about to face a major budget crisis that made a new strategic rationale 
mandatory”; it caused the CNO to “go into overdrive” in his negative response�65 
The slide “flipper” for that brief, Commander Paul Giarra, USN (Ret�), said, “The 
CNO left the room without providing any guidance to the assembled three-star 
officers present for the brief,” and for a time this caused great uncertainty�66
Even so, if the challenges had been limited to dramatically shrinking bud-
gets, Admiral Kelso might have had greater influence on controlling the Navy’s 
response to the empowered CJCS, but his immediate focus was on troubling 
service-specific issues� He was, in particular, distracted by negative publicity 
about the USS Iowa B-turret explosion, the Tailhook scandal, and the crash/death 
of F-14 pilot Lieutenant Kara Hultgreen, USN� In such an environment, Admiral 
Kelso could not concentrate on strategy as well as he needed to�67
EFFECT ON THE STRATEGY COHORT
The legislation affected not only the Navy offices that created strategy but also the 
careers of individual naval officers engaged in that effort� The new emphasis on 
joint, vice service, offices that the Goldwater-Nichols provisions demanded cre-
ated a significant impact on officers in the ranks of O-4 (lieutenant commander) 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   35 3/8/16   10:29 AM
15
Wills: The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
to O-6 (captain) who would normally have been recruited to serve in OP-06 (now 
N3/N5) and other purely service staff positions� Those officers were now drawn 
to joint positions to meet the new requirements that demanded joint service as 
a precursor to consideration for flag rank� The service solution was to “shorten 
some assignments and eliminate others” so that joint assignments could be fitted 
into the same nominal twenty-year career plan demanded by the 1980 Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act�68
The addition of joint assignments was further complicated by an overall man-
power reduction at the end of the Cold War� The number of Navy joint billets 
for officers in the ranks of O-4 to O-6 increased by 10 percent over the period 
1989–99 in spite of a nearly 15 percent overall postwar decline in the number 
of officers in those ranks�69 
These changes also seem 
to have affected the overall 
amount of service-based ex-
pertise that the average naval 
officer acquired over the course of his or her career� A 2001 analysis suggested, 
“[t]he prescribed tour lengths in Goldwater-Nichols tend to deepen officers’ joint 
opportunities but may limit the breadth of experience�”70
The experience of the strategy cadre of OP-06 would not initially seem to sup-
port this assumption� The individuals who spearheaded the drive to create the 
NMS in the 1980s found continued employment in the strategy business during 
the 1990s� As noted at the outset, Captain Swartz, after some initial misgivings 
about having two consecutive joint assignments, became one of General Colin 
Powell’s special assistants� Captain Diamond became OP-603 (the Strategic Con-
cepts office of OP-06) in February 1990 and exerted significant influence on the 
development and coordination of the follow-on strategic concept to the NMS 
known as “� � � From the Sea�”71 Commander Sestak contributed what Diamond 
referred to as “the bumper sticker” for the new strategy in the phrase, “The Navy/
Marine Corps Team is the Enabling Force for Follow-on Joint Operations�”72 Dia-
mond, along with Swartz and other OP-60, OP-00K, and SSG alumni, founded a 
regular naval strategy discussion group that first began meeting in 1988�73
Yet while these officers continued their strategic vocation in both Navy and 
later joint offices involved in producing strategic work, their shoes were not be-
ing filled by a new generation of Navy-created strategy experts� The provisions 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act appear to be the direct cause of this change, in the 
eyes of some of these experts� Captain R� Robinson “Robby” Harris, a former 
member of the SSG and 00K, has suggested that the OPNAV staff in general is “a 
shadow of what it was twenty years ago in both quantity and background” owing 
to the changes caused by the legislation’s joint-officer requirements�74 The new 
The Navy had historically seen the whole of 
the world’s oceans as a unitary theater of ac-
tion uniquely suited to naval control.
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requirements for joint assignment appeared to have harmed the ability of the 
Navy to send officers to multiple tours within OPNAV strategy offices� Captain 
Johnson believes that the joint requirements prevented the Navy from sending 
officers to multiple assignments in OP-06 where they would have acquired fur-
ther strategic competence and maintained corporate memory in naval strategic 
planning�75 Before Goldwater-Nichols, Johnson asserts, it was commonplace for 
strategy-coded officers to have multiple OPNAV tours in strategic planning of-
fices�76 Now there is barely time for one such assignment if an officer is also to 
meet the joint requirements necessary for eligibility for flag rank� This lack of 
repeat experience in OPNAV has further weakened the Navy’s ability to create 
strategy on its own� Secretary Lehman says the joint requirements have created 
excessively large staffs that draw too many officers from experience-generating 
operational billets�77 Together, these changes have meant a Navy with fewer stra-
tegic planners and possibly less operational experience, and have forced it to fill 
a much larger staff pool, thus leaving it bereft of its own strategic veterans�
THE PRICE PAID
Of course the armed forces of the United States were going to face significant cuts 
in the wake of the Cold War� A new strategy would have emerged in response to 
this sea change in international affairs alone� The Goldwater-Nichols legislation, 
however, significantly complicated that process for the U�S� Navy�
The Navy had been the most significant source of organized opposition to 
the legislation, and its senior officers, at the end of the 1980s and in the early 
1990s, remained antagonistic to the law’s tenets as it struggled to adjust to a new 
international situation and a new internal Defense Department organization� 
The legislation did not have the same impact on Navy strategy as the end of the 
Cold War, but the empowered CJCS, new concepts in combatant commander 
area of responsibility, and the personnel changes demanded made the process of 
creating new strategies for the naval service, especially those involving a global 
responsibility, more challenging in the years after 1992� The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act gave the CJCS the decisive voice in determining naval force structure and 
how maritime geographic areas of responsibility were divided�
Further, the legislation altered the career paths of naval officers by mandating 
joint assignments as a precursor to flag rank� This action caused a practical mi-
gration of talented, career-minded officers out of service offices such as OP-06, 
where they had been carefully trained, mentored, and subsequently assigned 
important Navy follow-on assignments, into joint billets in which the Navy could 
no longer make direct use of their talents� These officers continued to contribute 
to the process of strategy creation in the 1990s, but there was no longer a strong 
service staff organization to mentor and aid them in their development�
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These changes caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 fundamentally al-
tered the process by which the U�S� Navy developed both strategy and the people 
involved in that creative process� While these changes did not have a significant 
negative impact in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, they later af-
fected the Navy’s ability to emulate the Maritime Strategy experience and again 
produce war-winning global strategic concepts in response to regional threats 
that can no longer be contained by regional planning alone—concepts that ef-
fectively employ the inherent mobility, flexibility, and power of a globally deploy-
able, free-ranging, offensively oriented fleet� 
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